Sunday, May 16, 2004
Special Access Program: Hersh's real story and what it means
Seymour Hersh kicked the Abu Ghraib story into another level today (the ugly story).
The real story is the Special Access Program of targetted assassination
Here's the money paragraph:
Note the order:
1. Kill
2. Capture
3. if possible interrogate
Note: AP gets this wrong. They call the SAP a program of "aggressive interrogation." But see above, especially the artful "if possible."
A classic non-denial denial from the Pentagon
Here's Lawrence Di Rita's non-denial denial, straight from the Pentagon. I quote it in full, for the sheer pleasure of wallowing in high-grade flackery:
Heh. The fact that they are "outlandish" and "conspiratorial" makes it par for the course with this administration. One fact (below) is challenged.
Right. It's a Special Access Program! It's secret, so they have to lie about it!
Whooo! Parse that one.... I can't, my head is starting to hurt.
Re Cambone: Hersh writes that Cambone was in charge of the SAP, which is the real story. This statement says "detainee or interrogation programs," so is a non-denial with respect to the SAP. Anyhow, Hersh has got two sources on Cambone, so I take that over the flak.
True, the sources are mostly CIA, DOD consultants, and JAGs. Does that make the story untrue?
Can we fight and win a war on terror?
So, the story is true.
The SAP is a program of targetted assassination of AQ suspects.
The story begins at Abu Ghraib, but becomes the story of how Pentagon neo-cons, in the fathomless incompetence that has become the hallmark of Inerrant Boy's malAdministration, brought the spark of the SAP's black world interrogation techniques and operatives together with the human fuel at Abu Ghraib: the human fuel of prisoners, demoralized GIs, their families, and the people in the legal chain of command. The explosion of torture begat an equal and opposite reaction: An explosion of truth-telling in the "white" world by the GI families to Congress (though ignored until they went to CBS), and ultimately by the legal chain of command in the persons of whistleblower Joseph Darby and General Taguba. Now the explosion is reverberating outward through the efforts of what we have left of a free press, doing its best in what we have left of a free society.
In danger, opportunity. Now that we know the way the Bush administration has really been fighting the war on terror, there is at last a way for liberals and democrats to begin to pose alternatives to it.
To begin with, the Bush administration has been making the same mistake all along: They retain the mental habits of the cold war, when our enemies were states. When fighting states, we could always, through our nuclear arsenal, say in effect to the leaders of enemy governments, "We can kill you. Personally." There are a host of works from the 60s, from Seven Days in May to Doctor Strangelove, that make this point. The desire of the Pentagon for a "bunker busting" bomb shows that this mindset persists today.
So, Bush thinks he can decapitate AQ, as if AQ were a state or a corporation, and sets up an SAP to do just that. But AQ and its mutatations after 9/11 aren't like states: They are a lot like the leaderless resistance championed by winger ideologues. AQ and its ilk are project-based and corpuscular: They fragment and mutate. We can't kill 'em all.
Even if we can't kill 'em all, was it right to try? Maybe. I don't like the prospect of a dirty bomb in Philadelphia's port any more than the next guy, and if there's a 200-person SAP, a "heart of darkness" as Hersh puts it, that prevents that, well ... Tell me the other choice that's better?
But the abstract question isn't really the right one. The real question is, Was the Bush Administration right to try? Here, the answer is almost certainly No, because they've already given ample proof they're incompetent at best, starting with the WMD fiasco, and continuing on with the botched post-war planning. And now they've proved it all over again: Assume that the SAP was justified; assume that it was keeping America (more) safe. In that case, the Bush administration has managed to blow the cover, not just of a single intelligence operative (Valerie Plame) but a large, critically important, and ongoing, intelligence operation. That's what the decision to combine the SAP with military intelligence at Abu Ghraib did.
So, still assuming the SAP program of targetted assassination was and is justified, how do things net out? With the photos, we've covered the walls of the Arab world with recruiting posters for AQ or worse. And if in fact the SAP did work, Bush blew its cover. I think it's a net loss. No wonder they don't know what to say.
It may be too late to put the toothpaste back in the tube. It may be too late to restore America's soft power—the reality of the freedom Bush keeps talking about—but let's hope not. Surely we still do have a reservoir of good will from those who seek to immigrate here, or having immigrated, send money home, among those with whom we have shared schooling, vacations, human contacts. Surely just as there are People of the Book there are also People of the Law, who would wish to see us restored by the better angels of our nature.
I still think the so-called war on terror is a law enforcement problem and should be treated that way: Wars against states can be won (or lost). Wars against social conditions, like poverty or drugs, are never won. The so-called war on terror falls into this category.
The Bush administration, in its crude and principle-free way, seems to understand this idea. Stupidly killing Saddam's sons, they were smart enough to hold Saddam for trial (though not smart enough to make the lawful conditions for that trial an end in itself). And even a show trial of the soldiers involved in the Abu Ghraib trial shows they understand the value of the appearance of the rule of law. (Like so many of the Republican talking points during the coup against Clinton, the "rule of law" was stood on its head as soon as Bush seized power.) So why not turn the appearance into reality?
Seems to me we could turn the war on terror into a law enforcement problem in the following way:
1. The American voters must repudiate Bush. There's no other way, since he's a proven liar, and no program he proposes will have credibility.
2. Publish whatever documents and directives there are that show Bush's plans for the war. The directive establishing the SAP would be a good start. Do the same for Bush's directives on treatment and handling of prisoners. Repudiate as much as necessary.
3. Restore the Geneva Convention.
4. Join the International Criminal Court.
5. Turn the SAP into a police-like force. We should be able to change the rules to put interrogation and capture first, instead of last, on the list. Then internationalize it, maybe through NATO.
6. When the SAP has some prisoners, try them. Now, we've got the rule of law back in place, and the court (the ICC) to do the trials.
7. Make sure the trials become a media event—the ultimate "reality show" that in fact it is. We're good at this, it's our ultimate soft power, and this is where the Hague has failed. If the court is sufficiently well run, it won't become a platform for fundamentalists we're fighting. Further, if the message of the the fundamentalists is as stunted and trivial as we think it is, we have nothing to fear. Finally, it will expose the workings of a system of justice and the rule of law to a worldwide audience. Heck, if people watch soccer, they'll certainly watch this.
8. Get serious about loose nukes. If we need war dogs and a heart of darkness for that, the world will understand.
If anyone thinks this is Utopian or idealistic—please, tell me how it is more crazy than what Bush is doing now?
NOTE Alert reader riggsveda recommends the following study by Dr. Jeffrey Record: "Bounding the Global War on Terrorism." Here's the abstract:
These are sober, Army war college types.
The real story is the Special Access Program of targetted assassination
Here's the money paragraph:
Rumsfeld reacted in his usual direct fashion: he authorized the establishment of a highly secret program that was given blanket advance approval to kill or capture and, if possible, interrogate “high value” targets in the Bush Administration’s war on terror. A special-access program, or SAP—subject to the Defense Department’s most stringent level of security—was set up, with an office in a secure area of the Pentagon. The program would recruit operatives and acquire the necessary equipment, including aircraft, and would keep its activities under wraps.
(via The New Yorker)
Note the order:
1. Kill
2. Capture
3. if possible interrogate
Note: AP gets this wrong. They call the SAP a program of "aggressive interrogation." But see above, especially the artful "if possible."
A classic non-denial denial from the Pentagon
Here's Lawrence Di Rita's non-denial denial, straight from the Pentagon. I quote it in full, for the sheer pleasure of wallowing in high-grade flackery:
"Assertions apparently being made in the latest New Yorker article on Abu Ghraib and the abuse of Iraqi detainees are outlandish, conspiratorial, and filled with error and anonymous conjecture.
(via DOD)
Heh. The fact that they are "outlandish" and "conspiratorial" makes it par for the course with this administration. One fact (below) is challenged.
"The abuse evidenced in the videos and photos, and any similar abuse that may come to light in any of the ongoing half dozen investigations into this matter, has no basis in any sanctioned program, training manual, instruction, or order in the Department of Defense.
Right. It's a Special Access Program! It's secret, so they have to lie about it!
"No responsible official of the Department of Defense approved any program that could conceivably have been intended to result in such abuses as witnessed in the recent photos and videos.
Whooo! Parse that one.... I can't, my head is starting to hurt.
"To correct one of the many errors in fact, Undersecretary Cambone has no responsibility, nor has he had any responsibility in the past, for detainee or interrogation programs in Afghanistan, Iraq, or anywhere else in the world.
Re Cambone: Hersh writes that Cambone was in charge of the SAP, which is the real story. This statement says "detainee or interrogation programs," so is a non-denial with respect to the SAP. Anyhow, Hersh has got two sources on Cambone, so I take that over the flak.
"This story seems to reflect the fevered insights of those with little, if any, connection to the activities in the Department of Defense."
True, the sources are mostly CIA, DOD consultants, and JAGs. Does that make the story untrue?
Can we fight and win a war on terror?
So, the story is true.
The SAP is a program of targetted assassination of AQ suspects.
The story begins at Abu Ghraib, but becomes the story of how Pentagon neo-cons, in the fathomless incompetence that has become the hallmark of Inerrant Boy's malAdministration, brought the spark of the SAP's black world interrogation techniques and operatives together with the human fuel at Abu Ghraib: the human fuel of prisoners, demoralized GIs, their families, and the people in the legal chain of command. The explosion of torture begat an equal and opposite reaction: An explosion of truth-telling in the "white" world by the GI families to Congress (though ignored until they went to CBS), and ultimately by the legal chain of command in the persons of whistleblower Joseph Darby and General Taguba. Now the explosion is reverberating outward through the efforts of what we have left of a free press, doing its best in what we have left of a free society.
In danger, opportunity. Now that we know the way the Bush administration has really been fighting the war on terror, there is at last a way for liberals and democrats to begin to pose alternatives to it.
To begin with, the Bush administration has been making the same mistake all along: They retain the mental habits of the cold war, when our enemies were states. When fighting states, we could always, through our nuclear arsenal, say in effect to the leaders of enemy governments, "We can kill you. Personally." There are a host of works from the 60s, from Seven Days in May to Doctor Strangelove, that make this point. The desire of the Pentagon for a "bunker busting" bomb shows that this mindset persists today.
So, Bush thinks he can decapitate AQ, as if AQ were a state or a corporation, and sets up an SAP to do just that. But AQ and its mutatations after 9/11 aren't like states: They are a lot like the leaderless resistance championed by winger ideologues. AQ and its ilk are project-based and corpuscular: They fragment and mutate. We can't kill 'em all.
Even if we can't kill 'em all, was it right to try? Maybe. I don't like the prospect of a dirty bomb in Philadelphia's port any more than the next guy, and if there's a 200-person SAP, a "heart of darkness" as Hersh puts it, that prevents that, well ... Tell me the other choice that's better?
But the abstract question isn't really the right one. The real question is, Was the Bush Administration right to try? Here, the answer is almost certainly No, because they've already given ample proof they're incompetent at best, starting with the WMD fiasco, and continuing on with the botched post-war planning. And now they've proved it all over again: Assume that the SAP was justified; assume that it was keeping America (more) safe. In that case, the Bush administration has managed to blow the cover, not just of a single intelligence operative (Valerie Plame) but a large, critically important, and ongoing, intelligence operation. That's what the decision to combine the SAP with military intelligence at Abu Ghraib did.
So, still assuming the SAP program of targetted assassination was and is justified, how do things net out? With the photos, we've covered the walls of the Arab world with recruiting posters for AQ or worse. And if in fact the SAP did work, Bush blew its cover. I think it's a net loss. No wonder they don't know what to say.
It may be too late to put the toothpaste back in the tube. It may be too late to restore America's soft power—the reality of the freedom Bush keeps talking about—but let's hope not. Surely we still do have a reservoir of good will from those who seek to immigrate here, or having immigrated, send money home, among those with whom we have shared schooling, vacations, human contacts. Surely just as there are People of the Book there are also People of the Law, who would wish to see us restored by the better angels of our nature.
I still think the so-called war on terror is a law enforcement problem and should be treated that way: Wars against states can be won (or lost). Wars against social conditions, like poverty or drugs, are never won. The so-called war on terror falls into this category.
The Bush administration, in its crude and principle-free way, seems to understand this idea. Stupidly killing Saddam's sons, they were smart enough to hold Saddam for trial (though not smart enough to make the lawful conditions for that trial an end in itself). And even a show trial of the soldiers involved in the Abu Ghraib trial shows they understand the value of the appearance of the rule of law. (Like so many of the Republican talking points during the coup against Clinton, the "rule of law" was stood on its head as soon as Bush seized power.) So why not turn the appearance into reality?
Seems to me we could turn the war on terror into a law enforcement problem in the following way:
1. The American voters must repudiate Bush. There's no other way, since he's a proven liar, and no program he proposes will have credibility.
2. Publish whatever documents and directives there are that show Bush's plans for the war. The directive establishing the SAP would be a good start. Do the same for Bush's directives on treatment and handling of prisoners. Repudiate as much as necessary.
3. Restore the Geneva Convention.
4. Join the International Criminal Court.
5. Turn the SAP into a police-like force. We should be able to change the rules to put interrogation and capture first, instead of last, on the list. Then internationalize it, maybe through NATO.
6. When the SAP has some prisoners, try them. Now, we've got the rule of law back in place, and the court (the ICC) to do the trials.
7. Make sure the trials become a media event—the ultimate "reality show" that in fact it is. We're good at this, it's our ultimate soft power, and this is where the Hague has failed. If the court is sufficiently well run, it won't become a platform for fundamentalists we're fighting. Further, if the message of the the fundamentalists is as stunted and trivial as we think it is, we have nothing to fear. Finally, it will expose the workings of a system of justice and the rule of law to a worldwide audience. Heck, if people watch soccer, they'll certainly watch this.
8. Get serious about loose nukes. If we need war dogs and a heart of darkness for that, the world will understand.
If anyone thinks this is Utopian or idealistic—please, tell me how it is more crazy than what Bush is doing now?
NOTE Alert reader riggsveda recommends the following study by Dr. Jeffrey Record: "Bounding the Global War on Terrorism." Here's the abstract:
The author examines three features of the war on terrorism as currently defined and conducted: (1) the administration's postulation of the terrorist threat, (2) the scope and feasibility of U.S. war aims, and (3) the war's political, fiscal, and military sustainability. He believes that the war on terrorism--as opposed to the campaign against al-Qaeda--lacks strategic clarity, embraces unrealistic objectives, and may not be sustainable over the long haul. He calls for downsizing the scope of the war on terrorism to reflect concrete U.S. security interests and the limits of American military power.
These are sober, Army war college types.
